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Recently, instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear power plants have undergone digitali-
zation. Owing to the unique characteristics of digital I&C systems, the reliability analysis of digital sys-
tems has become an important element of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). In a reliability analysis
of digital systems, fault-tolerant techniques and their effectiveness must be considered. A fault injection
experiment was performed on a safety-critical digital I&C system developed for nuclear power plants to
evaluate the effectiveness of fault-tolerant techniques implemented in the target system. A software-
implemented fault injection in which faults were injected into the memory area was used based on
the assumption that all faults in the target systemwill be reflected in the faults in the memory. To reduce
the number of required fault injection experiments, the memory assigned to the target software was
analyzed. In addition, to observe the effect of the fault detection coverage of fault-tolerant techniques, a
PSA model was developed. The analysis of the experimental result also can be used to identify weak
points of fault-tolerant techniques for capability improvement of fault-tolerant techniques.
© 2018 Korean Nuclear Society, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recently, instrumentation and control systems (I&C) in nuclear
power plants (NPPs) have undergone digitalization. Deterioration
and an inadequate supply of components of analog I&C systems
have led to inefficient and costly maintenance. Moreover, since the
fast evolution of digital technology has enabled more reliable
functions to be designed for NPP safety, the transition from analog
to digital has been accelerated. Owing to the distinguishable
characteristics of digital I&C systems, a reliability analysis of digital
systems has become an important element of probabilistic safety
assessment (PSA). Digital I&C systems include software which
provides a unique characteristic compared to analog I&C systems.
Also, digital I&C systems employ various fault-tolerant techniques
to enhance system reliability. The reliability of the software and
that of fault-tolerant techniques should be accurately estimated in
order to correctly estimate the reliability of digital I&C systemsby Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an
luation of effectiveness of fau
ngineering and Technology, h[1e3].
Fault-tolerance is a system’s capability through software for
helping the system to perform required functions correctly despite
the presence of faults. Fault coverage is a measure of the system’s
ability to perform fault detection, fault isolation, and fault recovery
and is mathematically defined as the conditional probability that,
given the existence of a fault, the system will detect and recover
from the fault [4,5]. If a system failure is detected by fault-tolerant
techniques, the failed system does not affect the system operation.
For instance, in a reactor protection system (RPS) which has four
redundant channels with 2-out-of-4 voting logic, when a channel is
failed and detected by fault-tolerant techniques, the voting logic is
changed to 2-out-of-3 voting logic. When two channels are failed
simultaneously, the RPS generates a trip signal regardless of trip
condition according to fail-to-safe design concept. Therefore, in a
PSA model, a hardware failure event and the fault detection failure
of its fault-tolerant technique are combined with AND gate. A fault-
tolerant technique may be an advantageous feature of a digital
I&C system. Research has shown that a fault-tolerant technique
may improve system safety. A specific fault-tolerant technique,open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
lt-tolerant techniques in a digital instrumentation and control system
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Acronyms
APT Automatic Periodic Test
ATIP Automatic Test and Interface Processor
BP Bistable Processor
CCF Common Cause Failure
COM Cabinet Operator Module
CP Coincidence Processor
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSD Component Self-Diagnostics
FV Fussel-Vesely
I&C Instrumentation and Control
IDiPS-RPS Integrated Digital Protection system-Reactor
Protection System
KNICS Korea Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System
MCS Minimal Cutset
MIAT Manual Initiated Automatic Test
MT Manual Test
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
OS Operating System
OSD Online Status Diagnostics
PLC Programmable logic controller
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment
RAM Random Access Memory
ROM Read Only Memory
RPS Reactor Protection System
WDT Watchdog Timer










Fig. 1. Coverage of three fault-tolerant techniques in a system [2].
Fig. 2. Fault-tolerant techniques in the IDiPS-RPS [15].
M.C. Kim et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx2however, cannot detect and recover all possible faults in a system,
but it may detect and recover only limited number of faults.
Therefore, it is important to quantify the effectiveness of fault-
tolerant techniques in estimating the reliability of the system [6,7].
A report published in 1997 by the US National Research Council
states that appropriate methods for assessing safety and reliability
are key to establishing the acceptability of digital I&C systems in
safety-critical plants such as NPPs [8]. A UK Health and Safety Ex-
ecutive guide also points out the importance of the PSA for
software-based digital applications as a demonstration of safety [9].
However, there is no widely accepted method for digital I&C PSAs
[4]. Conventional PSA techniques cannot adequately evaluate all of
the features of digital systems [10]. Kang and Sung found that fault
coverage, common-cause failures, and software reliability are the
three most critical factors in the safety assessment of digital sys-
tems [11]. Kim and Lee identified important factors affecting fault
coverage of digital I&C systems based on the literature survey and a
fault injection experiment on a digital system running example
application software [12].
If the fault detection coverages of a system with multiple fault-
tolerant techniques are considered in a PSA model properly, then
more accurate reliability of the system could be obtained. This work
proposed a method to evaluate the fault detection coverage of
fault-tolerant technique using fault injection experiment and pro-
vided the result of a fault injection experiment on a safety-critical
digital I&C system developed to be applied to NPPs. In addition,
to observe the effect of the fault detection coverage of fault-tolerant
techniques, a PSAmodel was developed. An analysis on the result of
the fault injection experiment is expected to provide deeper un-
derstanding on the effectiveness of fault-tolerant techniques
implemented in the target system.
2. Experimental environment
2.1. Coverage of fault-tolerance techniques
Digital I&C systems are designed using various types of fault-
tolerance techniques. Although fault-tolerance techniques aim to
enhance safety by detecting, isolating, and recovering from faults in
a system and eliminate the negative effect of such faults, imple-
mentation of more than one fault-tolerance techniques do not al-
ways guarantee that more faults will be detected and properly
processed. For example, a system with three fault-tolerance tech-
niques, as shown in Fig. 1, has different inspection ranges and
coverage. Some faults are detected by only one fault-tolerance
technique, and some faults are detected by two or more than two
fault-tolerance techniques. Also, some faults are not detected byPlease cite this article as: M.C. Kim et al., Evaluation of effectiveness of fau
with a fault injection experiment, Nuclear Engineering and Technology,any fault-tolerance techniques. However, it is possible to enhance
the overall fault coverage through an efficient combination of
multiple fault-tolerance techniques [2]. To ensure higher reliability
of the system, it is important to properly understand the effec-
tiveness of each fault-tolerance technique(see. Fig. 2).
In our work, a fault injection experiment on a safety-critical
digital I&C system were performed to have deeper understanding
on the effectiveness of fault-tolerance techniques. After examininglt-tolerant techniques in a digital instrumentation and control system
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2018.11.012
M.C. Kim et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx 3the effect of faults on the output of the target system, faults are
classified depending on which fault-tolerance techniques detect
the faults.
2.2. Target system
In our fault injection experiment, a prototype of the digital I&C
system that was developed to be implemented in a real digitalized
NPP were used. The target digital I&C system is the Integrated
Digital Protection System -Reactor Protection System (IDiPS-RPS),
which was developed in Korea [13,14] under the support of the
Korea Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System (KNICS)
research and development project. The IDiPS-RPS has four inde-
pendent channels, where each channel consists of bistable pro-
cessors (BPs), coincidence processors (CPs), an automatic test and
interface processor (ATIP), a cabinet operator module (COM), and
other hardware components. BPs receive plant parameters from the
sensors and discrete signals from the core protection calculator. BP
determines a trip condition by comparing the received plant pa-
rameters with the pre-defined trip set-points. The comparison re-
sults of BPs are transmitted to four channels of CPs which generate
a trip signal based on 2-out-of-4 logic. Based on the outputs of CPs,
the trip logic decides a trip condition based on selective 2-out-of-4
logic [15].
IDiPS-RPS has three fault-tolerant techniques as follows [15]:
- CSD: Each programable logic controller (PLC) module has its
own self-diagnostic algorithm. CSD represents the diagnostic
functions such as watchdog timeout error, execution cycle
violation, and instruction operation code error detection func-
tions of a processor module, and loopback monitoring and
input/output signal comparison functions of an input/output
module.
- OSD: The OSD is performed periodically by the ATIP. OSD in-
cludes diagnostic functions such as channel-to-channel com-
parison of the input signals, setpoint checks to verify the proper
setpoint settings, trip status check of BP and CP, and heartbeat
check of BP and CP [16].
- APT: The APT monitors the integrity of CP, CP and data link. The
monitoring functions of the APT consists of a BP logic test, CP
logic test, data link test, and input/output module test
In our work, faults were inserted into a BP of IDiPS-RPS. Among
the fault-tolerance techniques of the target system, three were
considered: OSD, CSD, and APT.
3. Fault injection experiment
3.1. Fault injection methods
Fault injection is a technique for validating the reliability of a
fault-tolerant system. It consists of controlled experiments where
the observation of the system’s behavior in the presence of faults is
explicitly induced. Fault injection techniques can be classified into
three main categories [17,18]:
(1) Hardware-implemented fault injection: This is accomplished
at the physical level by disturbing the hardware with pa-
rameters of environment (heavy ion radiation, electromag-
netic interferences, etc.) or by modifying the value of the
integrated circuit pins.
(2) Software-implemented fault injection: The objective of this
technique is to reproduce at the software level errors that
would have been produced upon the occurrence of faults in
either hardware or software. It is based on different practicalPlease cite this article as: M.C. Kim et al., Evaluation of effectiveness of fau
with a fault injection experiment, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, htypes of injection, including the modification of memory
data, the mutation of application software, and the lowest
service layers (for example, at the operating system level).
(3) Simulated fault injection: In this technique, the system un-
dergoing testing is simulated in another computer system.
Faults are induced, altering the logical values of the model
elements during the simulation.
Digital I&C systems contain various types of components such as
input/output modules, random access memory (RAM), read only
memory (ROM), central processing unit (CPU), and network com-
ponents. Every component has the potential to cause a fault, and
fault-tolerance techniques aim to detect, isolate, and recover from
these faults to prevent abnormal behavior in the system. To
correctly evaluate the effectiveness of fault-tolerance techniques,
the best method is to simulate all possible faults physically by using
hardware-implemented fault injections. However, it is difficult to
simulate all faults by using hardware-implemented fault injection
techniques because this requires expensive hardware, and some
faults cannot be controlled and are limited owing to the complexity
of the system. In contrast, simulated fault injection techniques
require the least cost and time. However, the reliability of the
experiment results is low because actual hardware is not used in
simulation. While software-implemented fault injection tech-
niques have several limitations compared to hardware-
implemented fault injection techniques, it is possible to examine
more tests in short time and with less cost. Also, the experiment
result reliability is relatively high compared to the simulated fault-
injection technique. Therefore, we used the software-implemented
fault injection technique in which faults can be injected into the
memory area using BP PLC modules. Our fault injection experiment
was conducted based on the assumption that all faults in a system
will be reflected in the faults in the memory area because a fault
should affect the memory area related to the calculation process or
variables and cause a wrong output of the system. A fault occurring
in any component in a systemmay have an effect on the calculation
process, reading input variables, generating output variables, and
so on. A wrong calculation, program halt, variable changes, or
wrong execution path may be caused by the fault. Conversely, a
fault may have no effect on the output. If a fault does not have any
effect on the output, then it is very hard to detect the fault because
there are no observable consequences from the fault. If a variable
related to the system output is changed by an inappropriate value
for the current situation, then the fault may be detectable.
The fault injection experiment was performed based on the
following three steps. First, fault types were identified according to
the effects of injected faults. Second, a memory area assigned to the
BP of the target system was analyzed so that faults can be inserted
into only used area and hence unnecessary injection of faults was
prevented to reduce the number of fault injections. Finally, the
faults were injected into the BP of the target system and the result
was analyzed.
3.2. Experimental setup
The fault injection experiment was performed on the memory
area of the BP application software. Faults were injected into the
memory area assigned to the BP application software by using the
Code Composer tool [19]. An automatic fault injection programwas
developed for the experiment. Fig. 3 shows the environment of the
fault injection experiment.
Permanent faults remain until the corrective action is taken,
whereas transient faults remain active for a short period of time.
Especially, transient faults are a major type of error in computer
memory, and in particular, about 98% of RAM errors are transientlt-tolerant techniques in a digital instrumentation and control system
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2018.11.012
Fig. 3. Environment for the fault injection experiment [15]. Fig. 4. Analysis on the memory area assigned to BP application software.
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short period of time, only permanent errors that could cause
problems with the RPS are considered. For example, the IDiPS-RPS
calculation cycle is 50 ms. Although the RPS fails to generate trip
signal at certain time because of a transient fault, a correct output
will be generated at the next time step after the transient fault
disappears. Since this work is focused on the safety, only perma-
nent faults are considered. For the experiment, only two types of
permanentmemory faults, stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1, were injected,
because amemory bit has a binary value (0 or 1). The purpose of the
fault injection experiment is to examine the effect of faults to the
target system and the effectiveness of fault-tolerance techniques.
The following limiting conditions were applied in order to reduce
the experimental time:
- Only a part of the memory area assigned to the BP was exam-
ined. A fault injection experiment with injecting faults into
every single bit of the memory assigned to the target system
requires a large amount of time and effort because of the large
memory size. Each fault injection takes approximately 1 min
before providing the result of the fault injection. In fact, a total of
approximately 8 million fault injections are necessary just for
thememory of the BP operating system (OS) code. Moreover, the
memory size of the BP application software is much greater than
that of the BP OS. Therefore, fault injections were performed on
3% of used memory area, and only two bits of each 32-bit
memory unit (0th bit and 31st bit) were examined. Usually, the
first bit (least significant bit) and the last bit (most significant
bit) havemore significant effect than the other bits because they
are used for determining the sign of the data or for checking
data integrity such as checksum algorithm. This limiting con-
dition is expected to result in more conservative result.
- The environment for the fault injection experiment is not
exactly the same as the actual operating environment. The fault
injection conditions differ from plant operating conditions even
though actual digital I&C systemswere used for the experiment,
because the fault injection environment is implemented using
only BP and ATIP. If other components were connected, different
behaviors could have been observed. With respect to fault-
tolerance techniques, it is expected that the result will not be
significantly different from those of the actual operating
environment.Fig. 5. Analysis on the effect of inserted faults and whether the faults were detected or
not.3.3. Experimental result
Fig. 4 shows the result of the analysis on the memory area
assigned to BP application software. From the analysis on the
memory area assigned to the BP application software, it was found
that 42.99% of the memory assigned to BP application software wasPlease cite this article as: M.C. Kim et al., Evaluation of effectiveness of fau
with a fault injection experiment, Nuclear Engineering and Technology,used and the remaining 57.01% was not used. It means that
inserting faults in the unused area (57.01%) would not have any
effect on the function of the BP application software. Only the faults
inserted in the used area (42.99%) might have any effect.
The used area (42.99%) of the memory assigned to BP applica-
tion software can be divided into the bits with 0 (31.08% of the
memory area¼ 72.30% of used memory area), bits with 1 (11.26% of
the memory area¼ 26.20% of used memory area), and meaningless
bits (0.64% of the memory area ¼ 1.50% of used memory area).
Inserting faults in the meaningless bits will not have any effect on
the function of the BP application software. Also, inserting stuck-at-
0 faults and inserting stuck-at-1 faults in the bits with 0 and bits
with 1, respectively, will not have any effect on the function of the
BP application software. Roughly speaking, it is expected that
73.80% (¼72.30% þ 1.50%) of stuck-at-0 faults and 27.70%
(¼26.20% þ 1.50%) of stuck-at-1 faults will not have any effect on
the function of the BP application software.
In the fault injection experiment, 50,980 faults were injected
into the used memory area. A half of the faults were stuck-at-
0 faults and the other half of the faults were stuck-at-1 faults.
Faults were injected into either the 0th bit or the 31st bit of a
memory address. Therefore, the injected faults can be categorized
into the following four fault groups, each with 12,745 faults:
- Stuck-at-0 faults at 0th bit
- Stuck-at-0 faults at 31st bit
- Stuck-at-1 faults at 0th bit
- Stuck-at-1 faults at 31st bit
Fig. 5 shows the overall result of the fault injection experiment.
It turned out that the target system produced correct output
(reactor trip) for 90.76% of the injected faults and produced wrong
output (no reactor trip) for only 9.24% of the injected faults.
Considering that initially 73.80% of stuck-at-0 faults and 27.70% of
stuck-at-1 faults, and therefore 50.75% of all injected faults were
expected not to cause any adverse effect to the function of the BP
application software, 90.76% is much higher than the initial
expectation. The high percentage of correct output seems to be
largely attributed by the simple binary output of the BP application
software. Because the output of the BP application is either 0 (nolt-tolerant techniques in a digital instrumentation and control system
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2018.11.012
Fig. 6. Dependency of the output of BP application software on the type and location
of the faults.
Fig. 7. Contribution of each fault group to the number of faults causing wrong output.
M.C. Kim et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx 5reactor trip) or 1 (reactor trip), the output is less affected by minor
changes in the values on the memory by the injected faults
compared to the case when the output is a real number or a com-
bination of real numbers.
Among those injected faults that resulted in the correct output
(reactor trip) of the system, 97.77% of the injected faults that
resulted in correct output (¼89.65% of the injected faults) were not
detected by fault-tolerance techniques and only 1.23% of the
injected faults that resulted in correct output (¼1.11% of the injec-
ted faults) were detected. It was already mentioned that about 50%
of the injected faults do not change what was originally written on
the memory by injecting stuck-at-0 faults on the bits with 0 or
injecting stuck-at-1 faults on the bits with 1 or injecting faults on
the meaningless bits. Therefore, it can be rather easily explained
that those faults were not detected by the fault detection mecha-
nisms. However, the remaining undetected faults (about 40%)
actually changed what was originally written in the memory but
the final output of the BP application software was not changed,
and the injected faults were not detected by any of the three fault-
tolerance techniques (OSD, APT, and CSD). Further investigation
will be necessary to trace how the change made by those faults did
not affect the final output of the BP application software and how
those faults could escape the detection by fault-tolerance
techniques.
On the other hand, for those injected faults that resulted in the
wrong output (no reactor trip) of the target system, opposite
observation was made. It was found that 98.28% of the injected
faults that resulted in wrong output (¼9.08% of the injected faults)
were detected and 1.72% of the injected faults that resulted in
wrong output (¼0.16% of the injected faults) were not detected by
any of the three fault-tolerance techniques. While the fault-
tolerance techniques were not effective in detecting those inser-
ted faults that resulted in correct output (reactor trip), it was found
that they were very effective in detecting those inserted faults that
resulted in wrong output (no reactor trip). Further investigations
will be necessary on the differences between those inserted faults
that changed what was originally written in the memory but
resulted in correct output (reactor trip) and undetected by fault-
tolerance techniques and those inserted faults that changed what
was originally written in the memory and resulted inwrong output
(no reactor trip) but detected by fault-tolerance techniques.
From the experimental result, it was found that 99.84% of the
injected faults that resulted in the wrong output (no reactor trip) of
the target system were properly processed, either by masking or
detection, and only 0.16% of the injected faults resulted in the
failure of the function of BP application software (generation of
reactor trip signal when it is needed), which is possible safety
concern. To further improve the safety of the reactor protection
system, it will be necessary to analyze in detailed why the 0.16% of
the injected faults resulted in wrong output (no reactor trip)
without being detected by any of the fault-tolerance techniques.
Fig. 6 shows dependency of the output of BP application soft-
ware on the fault group (combination of fault type and fault loca-
tion). It is found that the stuck-at-1 faults resulted in higher
percentage of wrong output (no reactor trip) compared to stuck-at-
0 faults. It is interesting that the stuck-at-0 faults inserted to 31st
bits have very little percentage (0.02%) of causing wrong output (no
reactor trip) of the BP application software.
Fig. 7 shows the contribution of each fault group to the number
of faults causing wrong output. It is found that a majority of wrong
output is caused by the stuck-at-1 faults at 31st bit, while the
contribution of stuck-at-0 faults at 31st bit is insignificant. The
contributions of stuck-at-0 faults and stuck-at-1 faults are 12.99%
and 86.01%, respectively, and therefore the ratio of the twoPlease cite this article as: M.C. Kim et al., Evaluation of effectiveness of fau
with a fault injection experiment, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, hcontributions is 4.88. It should be noted that the number of bits
with 0 and the number of bits with 1 are 72.30% and 26.20% of the
used memory area, respectively, and therefore the ratio of the two
is 2.76. By comparing the two ratios (4.88 versus 2.76), it can be
shown that possible harmful effect of stuck-at-1 faults might be
more significant than that of stuck-at-0 faults. While further anal-
ysis should be conducted to identify the reason of the largest
contribution of stuck-at-1 fault at 31st bit, it is possible to infer two
explanations based on the analysis results. First, as shown in Fig. 4,
the portion of bits with 0 is 31.08% and that of bits with 1 is 11.26%.
This high portion of bits with 0 causes the larger contribution of
stuck-at-1 fault injection. Second, 31st bit is the most significant bit
to determine operators or data types. While 0th bit changes the
number of data or address, 31st bit changes operators (e.g., AND
operator to OR operator) or data types (e.g., integer to float). These
may cause the significant contribution of stuck-at-1 fault injection
at 31st bit.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the three fault-tolerance tech-
niques, 4711 faults that resulted in the wrong output (9.24% of all
injected faults) were classified according to which fault-tolerance
techniques detected those faults. It is found that most of the
faults (4447 faults ¼ 94.40%) resulting in wrong output were
detected by both OSD and APT. 159 faults (3.38%) were detected
only by APT and 20 faults (0.42%) were detected only by OSD. CSD
detected only 4 faults (0.08%) which were also detected by both
OSD and APT. Because of the relatively small number of detections
by CSD, further investigation will be necessary on why the effec-
tiveness of CSD in detecting faults is small compared to APT and
OSD. As mentioned above, 81 faults (1.72%) that were not detected
by any of the three fault-tolerance techniques might raise safety
concern and therefore further investigation will be necessary for
those faults, too. Fig. 8 summarizes the classification described
above.lt-tolerant techniques in a digital instrumentation and control system
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2018.11.012
Fig. 8. Classification of 4711 faults that resulted in wrong output of BP application
software.
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The effect of the fault detection coverage of a fault-tolerant
system on the plant safety can be estimated based on a PSA
model. However, most current PSA models consider only fault
detection coverage of watchdog timer (WDT) with assumed value
(Lee et al., 2015). When the fault detection coverages of all diag-
nostic functions in a system are considered, more realistic result
can be obtained.
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show examples of two approaches to reflect
fault detection coverages on a PSA model. Both models represent
single BP channel failure. If one of the input modules, the processor
module, and the output module fails, the BP fails to perform the
designated action. The difference between two models is the
number of fault detection coverages. While three fault detection
coverages are model for three modules in the first model, only one
overall fault detection coverage is considered in the second model.
Since it is obvious a fault-tolerant technique has its own fault
detection coverage, the first approach is appropriate to obtain more
accurate result. If the fault detection coverage of each module can
be evaluated, the fault tree shown in Fig. 9 will show more valid
results. However, it is not easy to evaluate specific fault detection
coverage for a fault-tolerant technique because there are in-
tersections among them as shown Fig. 8. As described in the pre-
vious study (Lee et al., 2015), duplicated effect reflection on amodel
should be handled carefully. Moreover, it is expected that the dif-
ference between fault detection coverages is relatively low because
all fault-tolerant techniques have high fault detection coverage in a
safety-critical system. And since only fault detection coverage of
the overall system is estimated from the experiment conducted in
this work, the second approach is used to observe the effect of fault
detection coverage.
Tables 1e3 show the evaluation results with assumed fault
detection coverages based on the second approach. Evaluation was
conducted on three cases; WDT with 90% fault detection coverage,
when all fault-tolerant technologies with 90% coverage, and all
technologies with 99% coverage. The tables show the minimal
cutsets (MCSs) for the three cases. Since only fault-tolerant tech-
niques considered and their fault detection coverages are different
in three cases, the other basic events have the same value. For
example, the failure probability of ‘Pressurizer pressure measure-
ment loops CCF þ Manual reactor trip failure’ and ‘Trip circuit
breakers CCF þ Manual reactor trip failure’ have the same failurePlease cite this article as: M.C. Kim et al., Evaluation of effectiveness of fau
with a fault injection experiment, Nuclear Engineering and Technology,probability in all cases. On the other hand, the failure probabilities
related to the failure of digital I&C systems are decreasing as more
fault-tolerant techniques considered and their fault detection
coverages increase. While the most significant MCS is CCF of RPS
output modules in the first case, ‘Pressurizer pressure measure-
ment loops CCFþManual reactor trip failure’ is the most significant
MCR in the other cases. In the last case, top three importance MCSs
are not related to digital I&C systems.
As shown in Fig. 11, the contribution failure probability on
demand of RPS for each case is 2.02E-06, 1.03E-06, and 6.58E-07,
respectively. Contribution of digital I & C system failure on
reactor trip failure is 79%, 40%, and 5%, respectively. It can be said
that if a digital I&C system has fault-tolerant techniques with
extremely high fault detection coverage, the failure of the digital
system can be almost negligible when evaluating the system
reliability.
Although the total fault detection coverage of the RPS is not
evaluated in the fault injection experiment of this work, the effect
of RPS fault-tolerant techniques on reactor trip failure can be
roughly estimated based on the evaluated fault detection coverage
of the BP. If the RPS fault detection coverage has the similar level of
fault detection coverage with that of the BP (98.28%), the reactor
trip failure probability on demand will reduce more than 50% of
that in a PSAmodel considering onlyWDT fault detection coverage.
Moreover, the contribution of failure of digital RPS on reactor trip
failure will be about 5%. However, to evaluate accurate the overall
fault detection coverage of the RPS, large scale fault injection
experiment is necessary.5. Discussion
In this work, the fault detection coverage of digitalized RPS was
evaluated based on a fault injection experiment, and its effect on
the system failure was estimated using the PSAmodel. In the result,
it was observed that a fault detection coverage has great effect on
the system failure probability. Therefore, evaluating fault detection
coverages is important for more realistic reliability assessment for
digitalized systems. The following issues need to be further inves-
tigated to derive more concrete conclusions from the fault injection
experiment:
- It is not easy to perform a fault injection experiment for the
whole memory area because it requires a large amount of time
and effort. In this fault injection experiment, faults were injec-
ted into only 3% of the used memory area. This was approxi-
mately 1.33% of the whole memory area. Although the fault
injection experiment described in this paper provides important
insights on the effect of fault occurrence on the function of
digital I&C systems and the effectiveness of fault-tolerance
techniques, a larger-scale fault injection experiments will be
more beneficial in widening our understanding on them.
- The result of the fault injection experiment may be used to
quantify the fault coverage of fault-tolerance techniques. The
fault injection experiment was performed based on the
assumption that all faults of digital I&C components are re-
flected in the memory, and the failure rate of the memory is not
considered. However, different memory bits may have different
failure rates because of the loading frequency, addressed vari-
able/code, and so on.
- Different software functions are used according to different
scenarios. A function for a given situation can be identified
based on the software function analysis. For example, for a trip
signal generation, only functions related to the generation of a



























































Fig. 9. Fault tree of BP considering specific fault detection coverages.
M.C. Kim et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Technology xxx (xxxx) xxx 76. Conclusions
The reliability of software and fault-tolerant techniques should
be evaluated to estimate the reliability of digital I&C systems. In the
present work, a fault injection experiment on a safety-critical dig-
ital I&C system was performed to examine the effect of fault
occurrence in digital I&C systems and the effectiveness of fault-
tolerant techniques on the fault occurrence. A software-
implemented fault injection technique in which faults can be
injected into the memory area was used based on the assumption
that all faults in a system will be reflected in the faults in the
memory area. The fault injection experiment was performed based
on the following three steps. First, fault types were identified ac-
cording to the effects of the injected faults. Second, the memory
area assigned to the BP application software of the target system
was analyzed for more efficient fault injections. Unnecessary in-
jection of faults was prevented as much as possible to reduce the
required number of fault injections. Finally, the fault injection
experiment was performed, and the result was analyzed.
From the fault injection experiment, it was first found that the
BP application software is very resilient to the fault occurrence in
the digital I&C system. More than 90% of injected faults did not
cause any adverse effect on the function of the BP application
software. It is also important to recognize that some faults actually
changed the values written on the memory but did not change the
final output of the BP application software.
Second, it was found that fault-tolerance techniques were very
effective on the faults that resulted in wrong output of BP appli-
cation software. Even though only 1.23% of injected faults could bePlease cite this article as: M.C. Kim et al., Evaluation of effectiveness of fau
with a fault injection experiment, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, hdetected by fault-tolerance techniques when the BP application
software provided correct output, up to 98.28% of the injected faults
were detected by fault-tolerance techniques when the BP applica-
tion software provided wrong output.
Third, most of the detected faults were detected by both APTand
OSD. It was found that 94.40% of the faults resulting in wrong
output were detected by both OSD and APT. It seems that some
faults cause significant deviation from the normal control flow of
BP application software or change the values written in the mem-
ory and hence more easily detected by fault-tolerance techniques.
Fourth, possible harmful effect of stuck-at-1 faults might be
more significant than that of stuck-at-0 faults. While the used area
of the memory consists of 72.30% of bits with 0, 26.20% of bits with
1, and 1.50% of meaningless memory, the contributions of stuck-at-
1 faults and stuck-at-0 faults to those faults resulting in wrong
output were 86.01% and 12.99%, respectively. It means that rela-
tively higher potential of causing wrong output was observed in
stuck-at-1 faults.
Fifth, it is expected that the RPS failure probability decreases
much by reflecting the fault detection coverage on a PSA model.
From the fault injection experiment, the fault detection coverage of
the BP was evaluated as 98.28%. If an RPS has the similar level of
fault detection coverage with the evaluated fault detection
coverage of the BP, the reactor trip failure probability on demand
reduces about 3 times compared to that of the model which only
WDT fault detection coverage. Especially, the contribution of digital
I&C system failure on the reactor trip failure reduced significantly.
Therefore, to obtain more reliable reliability of digital I&C systems
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Fig. 10. Fault tree of BP considering overall fault detection coverage.
Table 1
Minimal cutsets for case only with WDT (90%).
Failure probability Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance Basic Event 1 Basic Event 2 Basic Event 3 Basic Event 4
7.26E-07 0.360005 CP OM CCF FD MB1
3.70E-07 0.183308 MLKPT MB1
3.65E-07 0.181270 BP IM CCF FD MB1
2.06E-07 0.102044 CP PM CCF FD MB1
1.63E-07 0.080960 TCB CCF MB2
1.03E-07 0.050958 BP PM CCF FD MB1
6.63E-08 0.032889 PTKPT MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTA TYPTC TYPTD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTB TYPTC TYPTD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTA TYPTB TYPTD MB1
Table 2
Minimal cutsets for case only with all fault-tolerant techniques (90% coverage).
Failure probability Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance Basic Event 1 Basic Event 2 Basic Event 3 Basic Event 4
3.70E-07 0.183308 MLKPT MB1
2.06E-07 0.102044 CP PM CCF FD MB1
1.63E-07 0.080960 TCB CCF MB2
1.03E-07 0.050958 BP PM CCF FD MB1
7.26E-08 0.070201 CP OM CCF FD MB1
6.63E-08 0.032889 PTKPT MB1
3.65E-08 0.035348 BP IM CCF FD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTA TYPTC TYPTD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTB TYPTC TYPTD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTA TYPTB TYPTD MB1
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Table 3
Minimal cutsets for case only with all fault-tolerant techniques (99% coverage).
Failure probability Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance Basic Event 1 Basic Event 2 Basic Event 3 Basic Event 4
3.70E-07 0.183308 MLKPT MB1
1.63E-07 0.080960 TCB CCF MB2
6.63E-08 0.032889 PTKPT MB1
2.06E-08 0.031264 CP PM CCF FD MB1
1.03E-08 0.015612 BP PM CCF FD MB1
7.26E-09 0.011030 CP OM CCF FD MB1
3.65E-09 0.005554 BP IM CCF FD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTA TYPTC TYPTD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTB TYPTC TYPTD MB1
3.03E-09 0.001505 TYPTA TYPTB TYPTD MB1
* FD: Fault-tolerant techniques fail to detect a HW fault.
* IM: Input module.
* PM: Processor module.
* OM: Output module.
* TCB: Trip circuit breaker.
* MB1: Operator fails to manually generate reactor trip signal.
* MB2: Operator fails to manually trip reactor (case of trip circuit breaker mechanical binding).
* MLKPT: CCF of all measurement loops for Hu PZR pressure.
* PTKPT: CCF of all Hi PZR pressure transmitters.
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Fig. 11. Evaluation results with assumed fault detection coverage.
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During the analysis of the experimental result, what need to be
further investigated were also identified. It was found to be
necessary to trace how the change in memory by those faults
resulting in correct output did not affect the final output of the BP
application software and how those faults could not be detected by
fault-tolerance techniques. It is also important in the safety view-
point to clearly identify why the 0.16% of the injected faults that
resulted inwrong output (no reactor trip) were not detected by any
of the three fault-tolerance techniques. Relatively low effectiveness
of CSD in fault detection also needs to be further investigated.
Even though there were several limiting conditions in the fault
injection experiment and the analysis on it in the perspective of
scale of the experiment, depth of analysis, and so on, many
important insights could be identified on the effect of faults and the
effectiveness of fault-tolerance techniques in a digital I&C system.
Weak points of fault-tolerance techniques will be analyzed in more
detail so that the results can be reflected in the design to improve
the capability of fault-tolerant techniques. A larger-scale fault in-
jection experiment is expected to be very beneficial for this
purpose.Please cite this article as: M.C. Kim et al., Evaluation of effectiveness of fau
with a fault injection experiment, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, hAcknowledgements
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